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The precedential force of decisions by a federal circuit court of
appeals might strike the typical practitioner as a settled issue. It is
axiomatic, for example, that a federal circuit court of appeals’ decision
on questions of federal law binds subsequent panels of that court and
district courts within that circuit, absent intervening contrary authority in
the form of a federal statute, a decision from the court of appeal sitting
en banc, or the Supreme Court of the United States. One might anticipate
that a federal circuit court of appeals’ “prediction” of state law in a
diversity jurisdiction case pursuant to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,1
would have similar force, but is this true?
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And what about cross-jurisdictional applications of federal court of
appeals decisions in state courts? State courts certainly do not consider
themselves bound by a federal court of appeals’ Erie predictions.2 But do
they feel similarly about a federal court of appeals’ decisions on
questions of federal law? For example, where the United States Supreme
Court and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court have not spoken on a Fourth
Amendment search and seizure question, does the Pennsylvania Superior
Court consider itself bound by a Third Circuit decision addressing that
question?
Needless to say, how a particular court treats federal court of
appeals’ precedent can often be critical in litigation. For example,
counsel handling a case in Mississippi state court implicating a question
of federal law should be well aware that a Fifth Circuit decision on that
question will control the Mississippi court.3 And counsel preparing an
appeal of a state law question before the Fifth Circuit should be
cognizant of that court’s strong deference to its own precedent on the
question, whether or not the relevant state’s intermediate appellate court
has weighed in on it.4
This Article will provide a thorough examination of the state of the
law on each of these important questions of federal court of appeals’
precedent, and offer some analysis on the correctness of the various
approaches taken to these questions.
I.

FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS’ ERIE PREDICTIONS

A. Erie and the Supreme Court’s Teachings on How to Make Erie
Predictions
In Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, the Supreme Court overruled its
decision in Swift v. Tyson5 and held that in cases where state law
provides the rule of decision, federal courts have a constitutionallyrooted obligation to ascertain and apply “the law of the state.”6 The Court
declared that “whether the law of the State shall be declared by its
2
See, e.g., Cambria-Stoltz Enters. v. TNT Invs., 747 A.2d 947, 952 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2000) (Third Circuit’s interpretation of state law not binding on Pennsylvania state
courts) (citation omitted).
3
See King v. Grand Casinos of Miss., Inc., 697 So. 2d 439, 440 (Miss. 1997) (“This
Court’s task in the present case is simplified greatly by the fact that there is a Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals decision on point, which this Court considers to be controlling
with regard to the present issue of federal law.”).
4
FDIC v. Abraham, 137 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 1998).
5
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
6
Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
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Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter
of federal concern[,]”7 implying at least that federal courts must look to a
state’s highest court in ascertaining state law.8 Only a few years later, the
Court stated clearly that “the duty rests upon federal courts to apply state
law under the Rules of Decision statute in accordance with the then
controlling decision of the highest state court.”9
If a state’s highest court has not addressed an issue of state law, but
its intermediate appellate court has, how should a federal court in Erie
mode assess that intermediate appellate court decision? The Supreme
Court first addressed this question in a quartet of cases decided shortly
after Erie.10 In West v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., the Court
explained that a “rule of law” announced by an intermediate appellate
7

Id.
See Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REV. 651, 696
(1995) (noting that, combined with the Court’s pre-Erie deference to the highest state
court’s interpretation of a state statute, this statement from Erie “implies that federal
courts will find all state law in pronouncements of the state’s highest court.”).
9
Vandenbark v. Owens-Ill. Glass Co., 311 U.S. 538, 543 (1941). It should be noted,
however, that this rule is not ironclad. In Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, decided only
a few years after Vandenbark, the Supreme Court stated that “the rulings of the Supreme
Court of Florida . . . must be taken as controlling . . . unless it can be said with some
assurance that the Florida Supreme Court will not follow them in the future.” 320 U.S.
228, 234 (1943) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). See also Bernhardt v. Polygraphic
Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 205 (1956) (following old Vermont Supreme Court decision,
but only after finding “no confusion in the Vermont decisions, no developing line of
authorities that casts a shadow over the established ones, no dicta, doubts or ambiguities
in the opinions of Vermont judges on the question, no legislative development that
promises to undermine the judicial rule.”).
Often relying expressly on Meredith and Bernhardt, numerous federal courts
rendering Erie predictions have deemed themselves free to depart from a decision of the
state’s highest court in predicting how that court would rule. See, e.g., AIG Centennial
Ins. Co. v. Fraley-Landers, 450 F.3d 761, 767 (8th Cir. 2006) (stating that “[w]e are not
required to apply all decisions of the Arkansas Supreme Court [on matters of Arkansas
law], even if they have not been expressly overruled, if we are convinced that that court
would not follow them[,]” and refusing to follow a 1960 Arkansas Supreme Court
decision in ascertaining Arkansas law) (citation omitted); Swix v. Daisy Mfg. Co., 373
F.3d 678, 681 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Where a state’s highest court has spoken to an issue, we
are bound by that decision unless we are convinced that the high court would overrule it
if confronted with facts similar to those before us.”) (citing Bernhardt); MindGames, Inc.
v. W. Publ’g Co., Inc., 218 F.3d 652, 656 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that “there will be
occasional, though rare, instances in which the best prediction of what the state’s highest
court will do is that it will not follow its previous decision[,]” and refusing to follow a
1924 Arkansas Supreme Court decision in ascertaining Arkansas law) (emphasis added);
In re Ryan, 851 F.2d 502, 509 n.9 (1st Cir. 1988) (noting that Bernhardt “indicated that
on certain occasions a federal court need not follow an old state supreme court
decision.”).
10
West v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223 (1940); Fid. Union Trust Co. v. Field,
311 U.S. 169 (1940); Six Cos. v. Joint Highway Dist. No. 13, 311 U.S. 180 (1940);
Stoner v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 464 (1940).
8
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state court “is not to be disregarded by a federal court unless it is
convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of the state
would decide otherwise.”11 As discussed in the sections that follow, the
rule of West sets the stage for conflict and uncertainty in assessing the
precedential weight of a federal court of appeals’ Erie prediction where
the relevant state intermediate appellate court has decided the state law
question differently.
B. Federal Courts of Appeals’ Contrasting Approaches to Assessing the
Precedential Force of Their Own Erie Predictions
The Supreme Court of the United States has thus made clear that
while decisions from a state’s intermediate appellate court do not bind a
federal court rendering an Erie prediction, they must be considered, if
not followed, unless the federal court is “convinced” by “persuasive
data” that the intermediate appellate court decision would not be
followed by the state’s highest court. But the Supreme Court has not
addressed how a federal court of appeals should treat such an
intermediate appellate court decision when that decision conflicts with
the court of appeals’ own, previous decision. This creates an obvious
possibility of conflict, for it is well-settled that federal courts of appeals
follow their own, prior precedent unless that precedent has been
abrogated by (a) federal statute, (b) a decision of the federal court of
appeals sitting en banc, (c) a decision of the United States Supreme
Court, or generally, in the case of an issue of state law, (d) a decision of
the relevant state’s highest court.12 Assuming none of these abrogating
events has transpired, how should a federal court of appeals treat its own
prior Erie prediction where that prediction has been rejected, criticized or
otherwise undermined by an intervening decision of the relevant state’s
intermediate appellate court? Should it blindly follow its own precedent,
pursuant to stare decisis? If not, under what circumstances can or should
it adopt the view of the state intermediate appellate court as the
appropriate Erie prediction of state law?
There appears to be disagreement among the circuits as to the
precedential weight afforded to a federal court of appeals’ prior Erie
11

West, 311 U.S. at 237. See also Stoner, 311 U.S. at 467 (“[F]ederal courts, under
the doctrine of Erie . . . must follow the decisions of intermediate state courts in the
absence of convincing evidence that the highest court of the state would decide
differently.”).
12
Although, as discussed above, the circuits have generally recognized their freedom
to depart from a decision of the relevant state’s highest court where there is good reason
to believe that court would not follow that decision. See supra note 8.
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prediction.13 There is language from decisions in a number of circuits
that suggests those circuits will follow their own Erie prediction
precedent despite a contrary, intervening decision from a state
intermediate appellate court. In Wankier v. Crown Equipment Corp.,14
for example, the Tenth Circuit, in a decision requiring the prediction of
Utah law, explained that when a court of appeals must perform its
“ventriloquial function” under Erie of predicting how the state’s highest
court would rule, it “is bound by ordinary principles of stare decisis.”15
“Thus,” the court concluded, “when a panel of this Court has rendered a
decision interpreting state law, that interpretation is binding on district
courts in this circuit, and on subsequent panels of this Court, unless an
intervening decision of the state’s highest court has resolved the issue.”16
As such, Wankier can be read to preclude subsequent panels of the Tenth
Circuit from ignoring a prior panel’s Erie prediction even where state
intermediate appellate courts have rejected that prior prediction, though
the court in Wankier did not confront that scenario.17
The Eleventh Circuit appears to have moved recently toward a
more robust stare decisis approach to assessing its own state law
predictions. In Palmer & Cay, Inc. v. Marsh & McLennan Cos.,18 the
court stated in dicta in a footnote that it was bound by its prior panel’s
decision on the relevant issue of Georgia law, notwithstanding an
intervening decision from Georgia’s intermediate appellate court to the
contrary, “unless and until [the prior panel’s decision] is overruled by
intervening, on-point case law from our circuit sitting en banc, the
Supreme Court, or, on matters of Georgia state law, the Georgia Supreme
Court.”19
13
See Jed I. Bergman, Note, Putting Precedent in Its Place: Stare Decisis and
Federal Predictions of State Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 969, 970 (1996) (noting that the
“rules governing the binding force of predictive precedents in the federal courts . . . [are]
confused and inconsistent.”).
14
353 F.3d 862 (10th Cir. 2003).
15
Id. at 866.
16
Id. (citations omitted).
17
However, it should be noted that it is not at all clear that this reading of Wankier
accurately depicts the Tenth Circuit’s approach to dealing with prior panel precedent that
conflicts with an intervening state intermediate appellate court decision. See, e.g.,
Perlmutter v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 54 F.3d 659, 662 (10th Cir. 1995) (“[A]lthough we are
not obligated to follow the pronouncements of lower state courts, ‘in the absence of any
compelling reason to disregard them,’ we follow decisions of the Colorado Court of
Appeals as well.”). However, Perlmutter did not involve a choice between prior panel
precedent and a state intermediate appellate court decision.
18
404 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2005).
19
Id. at 1307 n.15 (citing United States v. Chubbuck, 252 F.3d 1300, 1305 n.7 (11th
Cir. 2001)).
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Other circuits apparently are more willing to depart from their Erie
predictions where there is a contrary decision from the relevant state
intermediate appellate court, though these circuits apply a range of
standards. While it acknowledges that it can and will follow state
intermediate appellate court decisions over its own Erie predictions in
some instances, the Fifth Circuit appears to follow a strong presumption
in favor of following its own Erie predictions. In FDIC v. Abraham,20 the
Fifth Circuit explained:
We are, of course, a strict stare decisis court. One aspect of
that doctrine to which we adhere without exception is the rule
that one panel of this court cannot disregard, much less overrule,
the decision of a prior panel. Adherence to this rule is no less
immutable when the matter determined by the prior panel is the
interpretation of state law: Such interpretations are no less
binding on subsequent panels than are prior interpretations of
federal law. . . .
We conclude then, that when our Erie analysis of controlling
state law is conducted for the purpose of deciding whether to
follow or depart from prior precedent of this circuit, and neither a
clearly contrary subsequent holding of the highest court of the
state nor a subsequent statutory authority, squarely on point, is
available for guidance, we should not disregard our own prior
precedent on the basis of subsequent intermediate state appellate
court precedent unless such precedent comprises unanimous or
near-unanimous holdings from several— preferably a majority—
of the intermediate appellate courts of the state in question.21

The Ninth Circuit appears to take an approach opposite to the Fifth
Circuit’s approach. In In re Watts,22 the Ninth Circuit concluded that it
would follow an intervening, state intermediate appellate court decision
“unless there is convincing evidence that the highest court of the state
would decide differently.”23 Thus, rather than applying a presumption in
favor of following its own view of state law, as enunciated by the Fifth
Circuit in Abraham, the Ninth Circuit appears to apply a presumption
against following its view of state law in favor of that articulated by a
state intermediate appellate court. Like the Ninth Circuit, the Sixth
Circuit also appears to be more willing than the Fifth to follow an
20

137 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 268-69 (footnotes and citations omitted).
22
298 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2002).
23
Id. at 1083 (quoting Owen ex rel. Owen v. United States, 713 F.2d 1461, 1464 (9th
Cir. 1983)).
21
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intervening decision from a state intermediate appellate court, finding
that a mere “indication” from a state intermediate appellate court that the
federal court of appeals’ prior Erie prediction was incorrect would be
sufficient to support the court of appeals’ departure from its own
precedent.24 The Fourth Circuit appears to be in general accord with this
approach.25
The Seventh Circuit does not consider itself bound by its own, prior
Erie predictions, but it has not settled on a definitive approach to
balancing those predictions with intervening decisions from a state
intermediate appellate court. In Taco Bell Corp. v. Continental Casualty
Co.,26 the court refused to follow Green v. J.C. Penney Auto Insurance
Co.,27 its own then-eighteen-year-old Erie prediction, where the Illinois
intermediate appellate court had unanimously rejected it since. The
Seventh Circuit explained:
In light of the Illinois Appellate Court’s unanimity [contrary to
Green] the best prediction differs from what it was when Green
was decided, and so that decision is no longer authoritative, just
as in a case in which a U.S. Supreme Court decision shows that a
previous decision by a lower court was unsound, even though the
Supreme Court doesn’t mention the decision.28

Despite Taco Bell, the standard the Seventh Circuit applies in
deciding whether to follow a state intermediate appellate court decision
arguably remains unsettled. Some decisions from the Seventh Circuit
indicate agreement with the Ninth Circuit’s presumption in favor of
following intervening state intermediate appellate court decisions.29
However, like Taco Bell, more recent decisions from the Seventh Circuit
evince an approach less reflexively in favor of following state
intermediate appellate court decisions. For example, in Reiser v.
24

See Blaine Constr. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 171 F.3d 343, 350-51 (6th Cir. 1999)
(panel is bound by prior panel’s decision predicting state law unless state courts have
indicated that they would have decided the issue differently).
25
See Assicurazioni Generali, S.p.A. v. Neil, 160 F.3d 997, 1003 (4th Cir. 1998)
(“[F]ederal court can depart from an intermediate court’s fully reasoned holding as to
state law only if ‘convinced’ that the state’s highest court would not follow that
holding.”) (quoting West v. AT&T Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237(1940)) (other citation
omitted).
26
388 F.3d 1069 (7th Cir. 2004).
27
806 F.2d 759 (7th Cir. 1986).
28
388 F.3d at 1077 (citation omitted).
29
See, e.g., L.S. Heath & Son, Inc. v. AT&T Info. Sys., Inc., 9 F.3d 561, 574 (7th
Cir. 1993) (“Decisions of intermediate appellate state courts generally control unless
there are persuasive indications that the highest state court would decide the issue
differently.”) (citation omitted).
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Residential Funding Corp.,30 the Seventh Circuit described intermediate
appellate court decisions as “just prognostications” that “could in
principle persuade us to reconsider and overrule our precedent[.]”31 Two
intervening intermediate appellate court decisions had rejected the
Seventh Circuit’s own view on the issue of state law before it. Calling its
own prior decision on the matter “an educated guess about how the
Supreme Court of Illinois will rule[,]” and refusing even to consider the
merits of the intervening intermediate appellate court decisions, the
Reiser court chose to follow its own decision, reasoning that “[i]nstead of
guessing over and over, it is best to stick with one assessment until the
state’s supreme court, which alone can end the guessing game, does
so.”32
The Second, Third and Eighth Circuits arguably have not settled
firmly on an approach to this issue. The Second Circuit has expressed a
variety of views. In Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,33 the Second
Circuit explained that “when a federal court must determine state law, it
should not slavishly follow lower or even upper court decisions but
ought to consider all the data the highest court of the state would use.”34
This view contemplates a predictive role largely, if not entirely, unbound
by prior panel precedent on the state law issue, but the Second Circuit
has not relied on it since. Two decades later, in Woodling v. Garrett
Corp.,35 the Second Circuit signaled greater deference to its own prior
Erie predictions, reasoning that “[a] ruling of one panel of this Circuit on
an issue of state law normally will not be reconsidered by another panel
absent a subsequent decision of a state court or of this Circuit tending to
cast doubt on that ruling.”36
The Third Circuit’s approach also is arguably unsettled. In Aceto v.
Zurich Insurance Co.,37 the Third Circuit observed that “[n]o one may
properly rely upon what we have held as more than persuasive on a
question of Pennsylvania law so long as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has not ruled upon that legal question.”38 More recent Third Circuit
decisions have cast substantial doubt on Aceto, though they have not
explicitly overruled it. In Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

380 F.3d 1027 (7th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1029.
Id.
378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967) (per curiam).
Id. at 851.
813 F.2d 543 (2d Cir. 1987).
Id. at 557 (citations omitted).
440 F.2d 1320 (3d Cir. 1971).
Id. at 1322.
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Inc.,39 for example, the court considered itself bound by a prior panel
decision on New Jersey law, observing that “[a]s a panel of this court, we
are obligated to follow a prior panel’s construction of New Jersey law
and as a panel we cannot reject those views simply because we think the
prior case may have been wrongly decided.”40 Relying on this passage
from Ciba-Geigy, the Third Circuit stated in Gruber v. Owens-Illinois
Inc.,41 “that, absent compelling distinctions, where one panel has
interpreted a state statute, a subsequent panel may not reject that
interpretation on the grounds that it believes the prior decision to be
incorrect.”42 More recently, in Debiec v. Cabot Corp.,43 the court,
quoting from its opinion in Smith v. Calgon Carbon Corp.,44 stated that
“in the absence of a clear statement by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
to the contrary or other persuasive evidence of a change in the
Pennsylvania law, we are bound by the holdings of previous panels of
this court.”45
Echoing the Third Circuit’s view in Aceto but going one step
further, the Eighth Circuit, in Peterson v. U-Haul Co.,46 explained that
“[i]n a diversity case neither this Court nor the District Court make any
declarations of law. . . . Federal court decisions in diversity cases have no
precedential value as state law and only determine the issues between the
parties.”47 The Eighth Circuit does not appear to have cited this
formulation from Peterson approvingly, though it recently opined in AIG
Centennial Ins. Co. v. Fraley-Landers48 that it had “never specifically
determined the binding effect of a state law determination by a prior
panel[.]”49 Having deemed itself free to adopt a definitive approach to
39

747 F.2d 844 (3d Cir. 1984).
Id. at 856 n.10.
41
899 F.2d 1366 (3d Cir. 1990).
42
Id. at 1372 n.7 (citing Ciba-Geigy, 747 F.2d at 856 n.10).
43
352 F.3d 117 (3d Cir. 2003).
44
917 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1990).
45
352 F.3d at 131 (quoting Smith, 917 F.2d at 1343) (internal citation and quotations
omitted). Given the weight of more recent authority in the Third Circuit, it may be that
the Third Circuit has abrogated Aceto sub silentio. As detailed below, however, many
district courts in the Third Circuit still perceive an intra-circuit conflict and have adopted
contrary positions on the precedential force of the Third Circuit’s Erie predictions.
Moreover, if Aceto’s observation that Third Circuit Erie predictions are no more than
persuasive can be characterized as its holding, the Third Circuit’s more recent decisions
appearing to reject that view would not be controlling precedent. See Ryan v. Johnson,
115 F.3d 193, 198 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[W]hen two decisions of this court conflict, we are
bound by the earlier decision.”) (citations omitted).
46
409 F.2d 1174 (8th Cir. 1969).
47
Id. at 1177.
48
450 F.3d 761 (8th Cir. 2006).
49
Id. at 767.
40
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dealing with prior panel state law decisions, the Eighth Circuit in AIG
Centennial proceeded to adopt the Fifth Circuit’s (and other circuits’)
deference “to prior panel decisions absent a ‘subsequent state court
decision or statutory amendment that makes [the prior federal opinion]
clearly wrong.’”50
It is thus apparent that the federal courts of appeals take divergent
approaches in weighing their own, prior Erie predictions against contrary
decisions by the relevant state’s intermediate appellate courts. Others
have thoroughly analyzed the correctness of these varying approaches,51
and it is not the intention of this Article to rehash those analyses. It does
bear noting, however, that those circuits who adhere more rigidly to their
own, prior Erie predictions arguably transgress Erie and, more
specifically, its progeny discussing the appropriate weight to accord
intervening decisions from the relevant state’s intermediate appellate
court. The Supreme Court instructed rather clearly in West that a “rule of
law” announced by an intermediate appellate state court “is not to be
disregarded by a federal court unless it is convinced by other persuasive
data that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise.”52 The use
of the word “convince” indicates a high threshold, suggesting that any
doubts about whether the state’s highest court would follow the view of
the state intermediate appellate court ought to be resolved in favor of
following the intermediate appellate court’s decision. West also requires
federal courts to identify “persuasive evidence” that the state’s highest
court would refuse to follow the view of the state intermediate appellate
court—a federal court cannot simply reject a state intermediate appellate
50

Id. at 767-68 (quoting Broussard v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 665 F.2d 1387, 1389 (5th
Cir. 1982) (alteration in original) (other citations omitted)). The Eighth Circuit did
acknowledge in AIG Centennial the existence of a contrary approach less deferential to
prior panel determinations with a “but see” cite to that portion of Jed Bergman’s Note,
supra note 13, that discusses the argument for according less deference to circuit Erie
precedent. Id. at 768. But it failed to cite and address its relatively recent decision in
Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 223 F.3d 873 (8th Cir. 2000). There,
the Eighth Circuit had noted that on the critical state law issue in the case, a more recent
decision from the relevant state intermediate appellate court had rejected the Eighth
Circuit’s own prior Erie prediction on the state law issue. The court concluded:
While we are loath to reject the considered judgment of a prior panel
decision of our court, our task is to apply state law, and while decisions of
the “various intermediate appellate courts are not [binding on us], . . . they
are persuasive authority, and we must follow them when they are the best
evidence of what [state] law is.”
Marvin Lumber, 223 F.3d at 883 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). Arguably,
AIG Centennial conflicts with this aspect of Marvin Lumber.
51
See, e.g., Bergman, supra note 13.
52
West v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940).
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court decision out of hand and without explanation in favor of its own,
prior Erie prediction. So understood, West would seem to preclude the
approach the Fifth Circuit outlined in Abraham, where it concluded that
it would adhere to its own Erie predictions notwithstanding intervening
decisions from the state intermediate appellate court, and would only
follow those decisions if they were unanimous or near-unanimous. The
Supreme Court may eventually decide to resolve definitively the
appropriate approach of federal courts of appeals to reconciling their own
Erie predictions with intervening decisions from a state intermediate
appellate court. Until then, practitioners would be wise to apprise
themselves of the contrasting positions of the courts of appeals on this
question.
C. Federal Courts of Appeals’ Erie Predictions in the District Courts
One might instinctively surmise that entrenched principles of stare
decisis compel district courts to follow the relevant court of appeals’ Erie
predictions. And, indeed, the state of the law throughout the country
generally reflects this.53 The Seventh Circuit recently reiterated this
command in Reiser and Taco Bell. In Reiser, the court admonished the
district court for refusing to follow prior Seventh Circuit precedent
construing the state law at issue in favor of two state intermediate
appellate court decisions post-dating that Seventh Circuit precedent:
By treating [the Seventh Circuit decision] as having no more
than persuasive force, the district court made a fundamental
error. In a hierarchical system, decisions of a superior court are
authoritative on inferior courts. Just as the court of appeals must
follow decisions of the Supreme Court whether or not we agree
with them, so district judges must follow the decisions of this
court whether or not they agree.54

53

See, e.g., Schwarz v. Nat’l Van Lines, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 2d 690, 699 (N.D. Ill.
2005) (in Erie prediction mode, “the Court is bound by the Seventh Circuit’s
interpretation of the content of unsettled state law.”); In re Exxon Coker Fire, 108 F.
Supp. 2d 628, 629 (M.D. La. 2000) (in determining issue of Louisiana law in diversity
case, “[t]his Court is also bound to follow the interpretations of Louisiana law by the
United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals absent some change in state law by the
legislature or the Louisiana Supreme Court.”); Perez v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 967 F. Supp. 920, 926 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (“Adherence by a federal district court to a
circuit court’s ‘Erie guess’ is appropriate, even when there exists a decision from the
state’s intermediate level appellate court that is inconsistent with the circuit court’s
resolution of the state law issue.”) (citation omitted).
54
Reiser v. Residential Funding Corp., 380 F.3d 1027, 1029 (7th Cir. 2004)
(citations omitted).
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Citing Reiser, the court in Taco Bell similarly chided the district
court there for refusing to follow the Seventh Circuit’s prior Erie
prediction in favor of intervening state intermediate appellate court
decisions, explaining in no uncertain terms “that the district court was
bound by [our prior Erie prediction], as a lower court cannot overrule the
decision of a higher one.”55
But not all district courts follow the strict directive of stare decisis
articulated in Reiser and Taco Bell.56 Some district courts follow the
same rule followed by their superior federal court of appeals—that a
federal court of appeals’ Erie prediction is binding unless subsequent
state court decisions or statutory amendments have rendered that
prediction erroneous.57 When making Erie predictions of New York law,
Judge Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York views the Second
Circuit as occupying the same position as a lower New York state court,

55
Taco Bell Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 388 F.3d 1069, 1077 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing
Reiser, 380 F.3d at 1029-30).
56
See, e.g., Johnson v. Symantec Corp., 58 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1111 (N.D. Cal. 1999)
(“Although a circuit court’s prediction of state law is not binding in the same way as is its
definitive interpretation of federal law, as a practical matter a circuit court’s
interpretations of state law must be accorded great deference by district courts within the
circuit.”); Stubl v. T.A. Sys., Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1075, 1093 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (observing
that where two decisions of the Michigan intermediate appellate court on issue of
Michigan law specifically contradict a prior Sixth Circuit decision on same issue,
“federal district court should adopt the state court’s interpretation.”) (citations omitted);
Nussbaum v. Mortgage Serv. Am. Co., 913 F. Supp. 1548, 1555 (S.D. Fla. 1995)
(refusing to slavishly follow Eleventh Circuit precedent on issue of Florida law where
Florida intermediate appellate court had decided issue in the interim contrary to Eleventh
Circuit’s resolution); In re N.Y. Asbestos Litig., 847 F. Supp. 1086, 1111 (S.D.N.Y.
1994) (“When a conflict exists between holdings of the Second Circuit and more recent
determinations of state appellate courts, the interpretation of the Circuit is not binding on
federal district courts.”) (citation omitted). Cf. Hollingsworth v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co., No. 04-3733, 2005 WL 563414, at *6 n.2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2005) (observing that it
did not have to “consider the debatable question of whether a federal district court is
strictly bound by its court of appeals’ prediction of state law.”); Hamilton v. Accu-Tek,
62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 847 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating that “[i]t must be remembered that no
federal court can speak to questions of state law with any certitude[,]” and that “for this
reason . . . it has sometimes been suggested that in Erie matters the district courts need
not follow as strictly as they would interpretations of federal law by federal courts of
appeals[.]”) (citations omitted).
57
See, e.g., Ridglea Estate Condo. Ass’n v. Lexington Ins. Co., 309 F. Supp. 2d 851,
855 (N.D. Tex. 2004), overruled on other grounds, 398 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. 2005), vacated
and remanded, 415 F.3d 474 (5th Cir. 2005) (reasoning that “if a panel of the Fifth
Circuit has settled on the state law to be applied in a diversity case, that precedent should
be followed ‘absent a subsequent state court decision or statutory amendment that
rendered the [the Fifth Circuit’s] prior decision clearly wrong.’”) (quoting Batts v. TowMotor Forklift Co., 66 F.3d 743, 747 (5th Cir. 1995)).
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and thus considers himself unbound by the Second Circuit’s Erie
predictions of New York law:
Where a conflict exists between holdings of the Second
Circuit and more recent determinations of state appellate courts,
this court will follow the outcome it believes the New York
Court of Appeals would reach, without giving binding authority
to the Second Circuit’s construction of the state statute. The
federal Court of Appeals is in the same position as a lower state
court vis-à-vis the New York Court of Appeals in construing
state substantive law under Erie.58

The district court in Westport Insurance Corp. v. Atchley, Russell,
Waldrop & Hlavinka, L.L.P.,59 considered itself free to depart from the
Fifth Circuit. The court concluded that “[i]nstead of relying exclusively
on older [Fifth] circuit opinions, . . . [it would] look[ ] to recent trends in
the jurisprudence of the Texas Supreme Court and Texas’ lower courts
for guidance.”60 After an exhaustive analysis of the relevant state and
federal decisional authority, the district court determined that the correct
view was that set forth in a concurring opinion in a state intermediate
appellate court decision, despite the fact that that view contradicted the
position adopted by the Fifth Circuit.61
The most fertile ground for disagreement among district courts in
the same circuit is in the Third Circuit, particularly among district courts
in Pennsylvania. In Hittle v. Scripto-Tokai Corp.,62 the court faced a
question of Pennsylvania law on which the Third Circuit had already
issued an Erie prediction, but that had not been resolved by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The Hittle court set forth the settled
standards for making an Erie prediction, but observed that “[l]ess clear
. . . is the extent to which a federal district court is bound by its court of
appeals’ interpretation of state law, especially if a subsequent state
appellate court contradicts the federal appellate court.”63 The court noted
that although the Third Circuit has indicated little about the topic, it “has
suggested[, in Aceto,] that the only law that is binding on a federal court
is the jurisprudence of the state supreme court, and that even a decision

58
In re E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 772 F. Supp. 1380, 1391 (E. & S.D.N.Y.
1991), rev’d on other grounds, In re Brooklyn Navy Yard Asbestos Litig., 971 F.2d 831
(2d Cir. 1992).
59
267 F. Supp. 2d 601 (E.D. Tex. 2003).
60
Id. at 615.
61
Id. at 621.
62
166 F. Supp. 2d 159 (M.D. Pa. 2001).
63
Id. at 162.
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by a federal court of appeals does not bind a district court.”64 Hittle
acknowledged the division among district courts in the Third Circuit on
the precedential force of the Third Circuit’s Erie predictions, but it
ultimately concluded that it need not follow the Third Circuit’s view on
the state law question before it.65
Like Hittle, many district courts have considered themselves not
bound by the Third Circuit’s Erie predictions.66 A number of district
courts have taken the contrary position, however.67 Yet other district
courts in the Third Circuit appear to adhere to a strict stare decisis
approach, but ultimately endorse a district court’s freedom to depart from
a court of appeals’ Erie prediction. In Stepanuk v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co.,68 for example, the district court, noting the Third Circuit’s
reasoning in Ciba-Geigy and Gruber that a Third Circuit panel is bound
64

Id. (citing Aceto v. Zurich Ins. Co., 440 F.2d 1320, 1321 (3d Cir. 1971)).
Id.
66
See Zimmer v. Cooperneff Advisors, Inc., No. 04-3816, 2004 WL 2933979, at *8
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 2004) (refusing to follow Third Circuit holding on state law where
contradicted by intervening, state intermediate appellate court decision); Carrasquilla v.
Mazda Motor Corp., 197 F. Supp. 2d 169, 173 (M.D. Pa. 2002) (the court, like Swinton,
endorsed Hittle and considered itself free to depart from Third Circuit’s Erie prediction);
Chesapeake Utils. Corp. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 704 F. Supp. 551, 558 n.18 (D.
Del. 1989) (citing and discussing Aceto approvingly, and refusing to follow Fourth
Circuit precedent predicting applicable state law because it had “perhaps even less reason
than the trial court in Aceto to be bound by the circuit court’s prior interpretation of state
law.”); Largoza v. Gen. Elec. Co., 538 F. Supp. 1164, 1166 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (“[I]t is
axiomatic that this court is bound by a decision of the Third Circuit predicting
Pennsylvania law unless the state supreme court issues a contrary decision or it appears
from a subsequent decision of the appellate courts that the court of appeals erred.”)
(citations omitted); In re Swinton, 287 B.R. 634, 636-37 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2003) (noting
that the Third Circuit “has not directly answered” the question of whether its Erie
predictions bind district courts and that “district courts have come to different
conclusions[;]” quoting and endorsing the analysis in Hittle, and thus deeming itself free
to “consider [a Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court decision handed down after the
applicable Third Circuit Erie prediction precedent] to determine whether the Court of
Appeals’ earlier prediction of Pennsylvania law [ ] was in error.”).
67
See, e.g., Fremont v. E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 988 F. Supp. 870, 875 (E.D.
Pa. 1997) (“[A]ccording to the Third Circuit, whose predictions of state law this court is
bound to follow.”); Itzkoff v. F & G Realty of N.J., Corp., 890 F. Supp. 351, 356 (D.N.J.
1995) (“[T]he Court is of course bound by any Third Circuit decisions regarding how the
New Jersey Supreme Court would rule.”) (citation omitted); Fed. Ins. Co. v. Livelsberger,
Inc., 868 F. Supp. 686, 689 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (“Our Court of Appeals has already made its
prediction on this point [of state law], and that prediction is the only one that matters
here.”) (citation omitted); Sprague, Levinson & Thall v. Advest, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 11, 14
(E.D. Pa. 1985) (“Decisions of an intermediate appellate court are entitled to considerable
weight but in the absence of a clear pronouncement by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, I believe I must follow” Third Circuit decisions predicting the issue of
Pennsylvania law controlling the outcome).
68
No. 92-6095, 1995 WL 553010 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 1995).
65
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by a prior panel’s construction of state law, stated that it was “axiomatic
that if another panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is
bound by a previous panel’s construction of state law then district courts
within the Third Circuit are also bound by that construction.”69 But the
court still left open the possibility that a district court could depart from a
federal court of appeals’ Erie prediction “if later state court decisions
indicate that the Court of Appeals’ earlier predication [sic] of state law
was in error.”70
As in the previous section, the question bears asking: Would a
district court run afoul of Erie and its progeny, namely West, were it to
adhere blindly to a federal court of appeals’ Erie prediction despite an
intervening, state intermediate appellate court decision disagreeing with
that federal court of appeals’ prediction? Recall that the directive in West
concerning the treatment of state intermediate appellate court decisions
in this context did not speak solely to federal courts of appeal—rather, it
spoke to “federal court[s],” presumably including district courts as well.
If West compels district courts to treat a state intermediate appellate court
decision as “persuasive evidence” of what the state’s highest court would
do, and forbids them from deviating from the intermediate appellate
court decision unless “convinced” that the state’s highest court would
reject it, then a district court may not blindly adhere to a federal court of
appeals’ Erie prediction.
However, West’s applicability to district courts faced with a federal
court of appeals’ Erie prediction must be analyzed by reference to the
established principle of stare decisis that requires district courts to adhere
to their superior federal court of appeals’ decisions, a principle often
referred to as “vertical” stare decisis. One might consider this principle
of stare decisis to be based merely on sound or wise policy—as mere
procedural scaffolding established by the federal courts of appeals and
district courts to facilitate the decision making process. On this view,
vertical stare decisis surely cannot circumscribe Supreme Court
precedent which counsels, at least in some cases, departure from superior
court precedent in the course of rendering an Erie prediction. But what if
this stare decisis principle is of constitutional provenance, rooted, as
some have suggested, in Article III of the United States Constitution?71
69

Id. at *2.
Id.
71
See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 723, 754 (1988) (suggesting that Article III may compel stare decisis
generally); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115
HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2125 n.167 (2002) (“Vertical stare decisis is probably required by
Article III, Section 1” of the United States Constitution) (citations omitted).
70

16

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 3:001

Whether “vertical” stare decisis is a constitutional command is an issue
well beyond the scope of this Article, but many have tilled its soil.72 For
purposes of this Article, it is at least worth asking whether, if vertical
stare decisis is constitutionally mandated, district courts are nonetheless
free or obligated by Erie and West to deviate from their circuit court of
appeals’ Erie predictions.
II. FEDERAL COURT OF APPEALS’ PRONOUNCEMENTS ON FEDERAL
LAW
This Article has focused exclusively on the precedential treatment
by federal courts of decisions by federal courts of appeals construing
state law. The focus now shifts to a converse scenario: how do state
courts treat the federal courts of appeals’ federal law pronouncements?
As Professor Zeigler stated in his seminal treatment of the question,
“[s]tate courts vary greatly in the weight they give to lower federal court
decisions[.]”73 The Supreme Court has never definitively resolved this
question, but a handful of its opinions have addressed it on several
occasions.74 In Lockhart v. Fretwell, a review of a habeas petition
seeking relief from a conviction rendered in the Arkansas state courts,
Justice Thomas observed in his concurring opinion that the Eighth
Circuit was “mistaken” in its apparent conclusion below “that the
Arkansas trial court would have been compelled to follow” the Eighth
Circuit’s own prior precedent on an issue of federal law.75 He explained
his reasoning:
The Supremacy Clause demands that state law yield to federal
law, but neither federal supremacy nor any other principle of
federal law requires that a state court’s interpretation of federal
72
See, e.g., Evan Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court
Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817 (1994); John Harrison, The Power of Congress Over
the Rules of Precedent, 50 DUKE L.J. 503 (2000); Rosenkranz, supra note 71; Bradley
Scott Shannon, May Stare Decisis Be Abrogated By Rule?, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 645, 646 n.2
(2006).
73
Donald H. Zeigler, Gazing Into the Crystal Ball: Reflections on the Standards
State Judges Should Use to Ascertain Federal Law, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1143, 1143
(1999).
74
See Arizonans For Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 58 n.11 (1997)
(referring to Ninth Circuit’s suggestion below that federal court decisions on issue of
federal law bind state courts as “remarkable”); Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 376
(1993) (Thomas, J., concurring); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 482 (1974)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring) (observing that “[s]tate authorities may choose to be guided
by the judgment of a lower federal court, but they are not compelled to follow the
decision by threat of contempt or other penalties.”).
75
Lockhart, 506 U.S. at 375-76. (Thomas, J., concurring).
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law give way to a (lower) federal court’s interpretation. In our
federal system, a state trial court’s interpretation of federal law is
no less authoritative than that of the federal court of appeals in
whose circuit the trial court is located. An Arkansas trial court is
bound by this Court’s (and by the Arkansas Supreme Court’s and
Arkansas Court of Appeals’) interpretation of federal law, but if
it follows the Eighth Circuit’s interpretation of federal law, it
does so only because it chooses to and not because it must.76

Since publication of Professor Zeigler’s Article seven years ago,
there has been an obvious trend in the states toward the view that state
courts are not in any way bound or controlled by federal court of appeals
(or district court) decisions construing federal law. Presently, at least
twenty-nine states expressly consider themselves unbound by federal
court of appeals’ decisions on issues of federal law.77 These twenty-nine
76

Id. at 376 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
Totemoff v. State, 905 P.2d 954, 963 (Alaska 1995) (“We are not obliged to follow
. . . a decision of the Ninth Circuit construing a federal statutory provision], since this
court is not bound by decisions of federal courts other than the United States Supreme
Court on questions of federal law.”) (citation omitted); State v. Montano, 77 P.3d 1246,
1247 n.1 (Ariz. 2003) (“We are not bound by the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of what
the Constitution requires.”) (citations omitted); Etcheverry v. Tri-Ag Serv., Inc., 22 Cal.
4th 316, 320-21 (Cal. 2000) (“While we are not bound by decisions of the lower federal
courts, even on federal questions, they are persuasive and entitled to great weight”;
“Where lower federal precedents are divided or lacking, state courts must necessarily
make an independent determination of federal law, but where the decisions of the lower
federal courts on a federal question are ‘both numerous and consistent,’ we should
hesitate to reject their authority.”) (citations omitted); Cmty. Hosp. v. Fail, 969 P.2d 667,
672 (Colo. 1998) (“Although the Supremacy Clause demands that state law yield to
federal law, neither federal supremacy nor any other principle of federal law requires that
a state court’s interpretation of federal law give way to a federal court’s interpretation
other than that of the United States Supreme Court. Thus, we are not bound by . . .
decisions of the lower federal courts.”); Macon-Bibb County Hosp. Auth. v. Nat’l
Treasury Employees Union, 458 S.E. 2d 95, 96 (Ga. 1995) (“[T]he decisions of the
federal courts of appeal are not binding on this court, but their reasoning is persuasive.”)
(citation omitted); State v. Simeona, 864 P.2d 1109, 1117 (Haw. 1993), overruled on
other grounds, State v. Ford, 929 P.2d 78 (Haw. 1996) (concluding that it was not bound
by Ninth Circuit decision construing United States Constitution) (citations omitted); Dan
Wiebold Ford, Inc. v. Universal Computer Consulting Holding, Inc., 127 P.3d 138, 143
(Idaho 2005) (“[T]he decisions of lower federal courts are not binding on state courts,
even on issues of federal law.”) (citation omitted); Indiana Dept. of Pub. Welfare v.
Payne, 622 N.E. 2d 461, 468 (Ind. 1993) (“Although U.S. Supreme Court decisions
pertaining to federal questions are binding on state courts, lower federal court decisions
may be persuasive but have non-binding authority on state courts.”) (citation omitted);
Top of Iowa Coop. v. Sime Farms, Inc., 608 N.W. 2d 454, 460 (Iowa 2000) (“Although
we give respectful consideration to the decisions of federal district courts and federal
courts of appeals on this issue [of federal law], we have the authority to decide this case
based on our own interpretation of federal law.”) (citations omitted); Shell Oil Co. v.
Secretary, Revenue and Taxation, 683 So. 2d 1204, 1209-10 & n.11 (La. 1996) (“While
77
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we may regard decisions of the federal Fifth Circuit as persuasive in certain cases,
particularly cases addressing purely federal questions, we are not bound by its decision
. . . . In matters involving federal law, state courts are bound only by decisions of the
United States Supreme Court. Federal appellate court decisions are persuasive only.”);
Pope v. State, 396 A.2d 1054, 1061 n.10 (Md. 1979) (“We note that unlike decisions of
the Supreme Court of the United States, decisions of federal circuit courts of appeals
construing the federal constitution and acts of the Congress pursuant thereto, are not
binding upon us.”) (citations omitted); Ace Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Comm’r of Revenue,
770 N.E. 2d 980, 986 n.8 (Mass. 2002) (“Although we are not bound by decisions of
Federal courts (other than the United States Supreme Court) on matters of Federal law,
‘we give respectful consideration to such lower Federal court decisions as seem
persuasive.’”) (citations omitted); Abela v. Gen. Motors Corp., 677 N.W. 2d 325, 327
(Mich. 2004) (“Although state courts are bound by the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court construing federal law, there is no similar obligation with respect to
decisions of the lower federal courts.”) (citations omitted); Citizens for a Balanced City
v. Plymouth Congregational Church, 672 N.W. 2d 13, 20 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (“We
are not . . . bound by any other federal courts’ opinion, even when interpreting federal
statutes.”) (citation omitted); Reynolds v. Diamond Foods & Poultry, Inc., 79 S.W. 3d
907, 910 & n.4 (Mo. 2002) (“In construing a federal statute, lower federal court opinions
construing a federal statute are examined respectfully for such aid and guidance as may
be found therein”; but stating that to the extent the Missouri Court of Appeals’ decision
in Fox v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 890 S.W. 2d 408, 410 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995)
“suggests [lower federal court decisions construing federal statutes] are binding, it is
overruled.”) (citation omitted); State v. Robinson, 82 P.3d 27, 30 (Mont. 2003)
(“Supremacy Clause does not require state courts to follow precedent from the circuit
courts of appeal interpreting the United States Constitution.”); Strong v. Omaha Constr.
Indus. Pension Plan, 701 N.W. 2d 320, 328 (Neb. 2005) (overruling its earlier decisions
suggesting that lower federal court decisions were binding on state courts, and
concluding that “while Nebraska courts must treat U.S. Supreme Court decisions as
binding authority, lower federal court decisions are only persuasive authority.”); Custom
Cabinet Factory of N.Y., Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct. of State of Nev., 62 P.3d 741,
742-43 (Nev. 2003) (“Decisions of the federal district court and panels of the federal
circuit court of appeals are not binding upon this court. Even an en banc decision of a
federal circuit court does not bind Nevada courts.”) (footnote omitted); Dewey v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239, 1243-44 (N.J. 1990) (noting that “New Jersey
precedent appears to hold that state courts are bound by the federal courts’ interpretations
of federal statutes,” but clarifying that inferior federal court decisions on questions of
federal law are not “‘binding’ per se[,]” and, pursuant to comity, should just “be accorded
due respect, particularly where they are in agreement.”); State v. McDowell, 310 S.E.2d
301, 310 (N.C. 1984) (in performing obligation to protect defendants’ federal
constitutional rights, “state court should exercise and apply its own independent
judgment, treating, of course, decisions of the United States Supreme Court as binding
and according to decisions of lower federal courts such persuasiveness as these decisions
might reasonably command.”) (citation omitted); State v. Burnett, 755 N.E. 2d 857, 862
(Ohio 2001) (“[W]e are not bound by rulings on federal statutory or constitutional law
made by a federal court other than the United States Supreme Court.”); Bogart v.
Caprock Commc’ns Corp., 69 P.3d 266, 271 (Okla. 2003) (“[B]y virtue of the Supremacy
Clause, we are bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court with respect to
the federal constitution and federal law, and we must pronounce rules of law that
conform to extant Supreme Court jurisprudence. We also recognize that nothing in the
concept of supremacy or in any other principle of law requires subordination of state
courts to the inferior federal courts.”); Page v. Palmateer, 84 P.3d 133, 139 (Or. 2004)
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states’ courts have generally echoed Justice Thomas’s reasoning in
Lockhart in concluding rather summarily that the Supremacy Clause
simply does not compel adherence to “inferior” federal court conclusions
of federal law.78
While the majority of states do not consider themselves bound by
the federal courts of appeals’ holdings on federal law questions, there is
authority in state appellate courts in Arkansas,79 Delaware,80
(federal court of appeals’ decisions construing federal constitution “not binding in this
court”) (citation omitted); Hall v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 851 A.2d 859, 865 (Pa.
2004) (“[W]e are not obligated to follow the decisions of the Third Circuit on issues of
federal law.”); Strouth v. State, 999 S.W.2d 759, 765 n.9 (Tenn. 1999) (refusing to follow
Sixth Circuit decision on federal constitutional issue, stating that it was “not bound by
decisions of the federal district and circuit courts.”); Penrod Drilling Corp. v. Williams,
868 S.W. 2d 294, 296 (Tex. 1993) (in federal maritime action, stating that “[w]hile Texas
courts may certainly draw upon the precedents of the Fifth Circuit, or any other federal or
state court, in determining the appropriate federal rule of decision, they are obligated to
follow only higher Texas courts and the United States Supreme Court”) (citations
omitted) (emphasis in original); State v. Austin, 685 A.2d 1076, 1079 (Vt. 1996) (noting
it is “axiomatic that the decision of the federal district court is not binding precedent upon
this Court.”) (citations omitted); In re Grisby, 853 P.2d 901, 907 (Wash. 1993) (“While
we always give careful consideration to Ninth Circuit decisions, we are not obligated to
follow them, and do not do so in this case.”); Elections Bd. of Wis. v. Wis. Mfrs. &
Commerce, 597 N.W. 2d 721, 731 n.19 (Wis. 1999) (“On federal questions, this court is
bound only by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. The value of the
opinions of federal courts of appeals and district courts is limited to their
persuasiveness.”) (citations omitted).
78
See, e.g., Cmty. Hosp. v. Fail, 969 P.2d 667, 671 (Colo. 1998) (“[N]either federal
supremacy nor any other principle of federal law requires that a state court’s
interpretation of federal law give way to a federal court’s interpretation other than that of
the United States Supreme Court.”); State v. Robinson, 82 P.3d 27, 30 (Mont. 2003)
(“Supremacy Clause does not require state courts to follow precedent from the circuit
courts of appeal interpreting the United States Constitution.”); Bogart v. Caprock
Comm’cns Corp., 69 P.3d 266, 271 (Okla. 2003) (“[N]othing in the concept of [federal]
supremacy or in any other principle of law requires subordination of state courts to the
inferior federal courts.”).
79
Malvern Gravel Co. v. Mitchell, 385 S.W. 2d 144 (Ark. 1964). Malvern involved
the application of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act and whether the defendant gravel
company and railroad was a “common carrier” under that Act. The Arkansas Supreme
Court stated that it was “bound by the decisions of the Federal Courts” in construing the
scope of the FELA and proceeded to discuss and rely upon multiple decisions from
federal district courts and the Sixth Circuit considering the meaning of “common carrier”
under the FELA. Id. at 147-48.
80
Atlas Mut. Ben. Ass’n v. Portscheller, 46 A.2d 643 (Del. 1945). In Atlas Mutual,
the Delaware Supreme Court stated that “questions relating to due process of law under
the Federal Constitution should be resolved in accordance with decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States and other federal courts . . . .” Id. at 646 (citations omitted).
The court went on to discuss and rely on a host of lower federal court decisions in
deciding the due process issues before it. Id. at 646-50. See also Klein v. Sunbeam Corp.,
93 A.2d 732, 733 (Del. Super. Ct. 1951) (citing Atlas Mutual for the proposition that
federal due process questions “should be resolved in accordance with decisions of the
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Mississippi,81 New Hampshire,82 South Carolina83 and Utah84 suggesting
that courts in those states adhere to the rule that they are bound by those
holdings.85
A number of other states appear to be divided on the issue. For
example, Florida appellate courts have taken contradictory positions. In
Humphreys v. State, the Florida Supreme Court, after setting forth a
particular proposition of federal constitutional law, stated that “such is
the holding of the unbroken current of decisions of the [S]upreme Court
of the United States and of other [f]ederal [c]ourts, by which decisions
we are bound, when called upon to adjudicate questions of constitutional
law arising under section 10 of Article I of the [C]onstitution of the
United States.”86 The Florida District Court of Appeal adhered to this
view several decades later in Ratner v. Arrington,87 citing Humphreys for
the proposition that “we are not free to place upon the federal statute the
interpretation thus contended for by appellants, as we must give effect to
the construction given it by the federal appellate courts[,]” and, relying
on several decisions from federal courts of appeals and district courts
construing a federal statute, rejected an argument that testimony was
Federal Courts” and similarly discussing and relying on lower federal court decisions for
its holding).
81
King v. Grand Casinos of Miss., Inc., 697 So. 2d 439, 440 (Miss. 1997) (“This
Court’s task in the present case is simplified greatly by the fact that there is a Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals decision on point, which this Court considers to be controlling
with regard to the present issue of federal law.”).
82
Desmarais v. Joy Mfg. Co., 538 A.2d 1218 (N.H. 1988). Desmarais involved a
claim under the federal Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). At the
outset of the court’s analysis, it observed that “in exercising our jurisdiction with respect
to what is essentially a federal question, we are guided and bound by federal statutes and
decisions of the federal courts interpreting those statutes.” Id. at 1220. The court went on
to cite liberally to decisions from various federal courts of appeals and district courts. Id.
at 1220-23.
83
South Carolina v. Ford Motor Co., 38 S.E.2d 242, 247 (S.C. 1946) (in case
involving federal constitutional challenges to application of state statute, stating that
federal court authorities “are controlling of the meaning and effect of the Federal
Constitution.”).
84
Kuchenmeister v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake R.R. Co., 172 P. 725, 727 (Utah 1918)
(“If . . . there is a decision from a federal court which is decisive of the [federal] question
here [i.e., scope of FELA], and especially if the federal decision is one that is more recent
than the one cited from a state court, it is our duty to follow the federal court rather than
the state court, since the question involved is one upon which the federal courts have the
ultimate right to speak.”).
85
While these decisions have not been expressly overruled, many of them are
obviously quite old. The general trend in the state courts gives good reason to believe that
if the courts that rendered these decisions considered the issue today, they would join the
trend and conclude that federal courts’ federal law holdings do not bind them.
86
145 So. 858, 861 (Fla. 1933) (citation omitted).
87
111 So. 2d 82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
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inadmissible under that federal statute.88 In State v. Dwyer,89 the Florida
Supreme Court, without even citing Humphreys or its reasoning
concerning the force of federal court of appeals’ federal law holdings,
concluded that “[e]ven though lower federal court rulings may be in
some instances persuasive, such rulings are not binding on state
courts.”90 But just a year later, the Florida Supreme Court, this time
without mentioning Dwyer or Humphreys, but instead citing Ratner,
stated in dicta that “[w]e recognize, of course, that state courts are bound
by federal court determinations of federal law questions.”91 State
appellate courts in Kansas,92 Kentucky,93 South Dakota94 and West
Virginia95 appear to be similarly divided in their approaches to applying
federal court of appeals’ federal law holdings.
88

Id. at 84-85 (citations omitted).
332 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 1976).
90
Id. at 335.
91
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So. 2d 372, 375 n.9 (Fla. 1977) (citing Ratner, 111
So. 2d 82).
92
Compare Krouse v. Lowden, 109 P.2d 138, 143 (Kan. 1941) (“[A]s to federal
statutes the interpretation placed upon them by federal courts, and particularly by the
United States [S]upreme Court, is controlling upon state courts.”) (citation omitted), with
Local Lodge No. 774 v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 352 P.2d 420, 424 (Kan. 1960) (“as to
national policy the decisions of the federal courts are entitled to great weight in cases
construing the [federal] Labor Management Relations Act.”).
93
Compare Stephenson v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 2002-CA-001796-MR., 2003 WL
22113458, at *6 n.4 (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2003) (concluding that trial court’s belief that
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit was controlling was
“erroneous” because “the decisions of the lower federal courts, although persuasive, are
not binding.”) (citations omitted), with Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Home Fruit & Produce
Co., 220 S.W. 2d 558, 560 (Ky. Ct. App. 1949) (discussing federal court of appeals’
decision construing federal Interstate Commerce Act (“ICA”) and stating that because
shipment at issue in the case fell under the ICA, “rulings of the Federal court thereon are
persuasive if not binding on this court.”).
94
Compare St. Cloud v. Leapley, 521 N.W. 2d 118, 122 (S.D. 1994) (in case
involving question of federal criminal jurisdiction that United States District Court for the
District of South Dakota had previously resolved, stating that “with respect to what is
essentially a federal question, we are guided and bound by federal statutes and decisions
of the federal courts interpreting those statutes.”), and Fall River County v. S.D. Dep’t of
Revenue, 552 N.W. 2d 620, 628 (S.D. 1996) (quoting St. Cloud’s view of binding effect
of federal court precedent construing federal law), with State v. Greger, 559 N.W.2d 854,
859 (S.D. 1997) (refusing to consider itself bound by Eighth Circuit’s decision on federal
jurisdictional issue in case, and noting, but not expressly overruling, the principle in St.
Cloud).
95
Compare Abrams v. W. Va. Racing Comm’n, 263 S.E. 2d 103, 106 (W. Va. 1980)
(“Nor can there be doubt that an interpretation of the United States Constitution by a
federal court will override that of a state court.”) (citation omitted), with Cook v. Lilly,
208 S.E. 2d 784, 786 (W. Va. 1974) (in case raising Fourteenth Amendment due process
clause challenge to state statute, following as persuasive the “unanimous holding of all
United States Circuit Courts” on the particular issue, but stating that “this Court is not
bound by lower federal court rulings.”).
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Several states appear to have adopted a hybrid approach,
concluding that they will follow federal court precedent but only when it
is uniform, i.e., when all federal courts that have addressed a point of
federal law have reached the same conclusion. In Ex parte Bozeman,96
the Alabama Supreme Court stated that “[i]f the United States Supreme
Court had already ruled on [the particular issue concerning interpretation
of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers], or if all federal circuits were
in agreement on this issue, we would accept” such view, thus suggesting
that it would, in effect, consider itself bound by uniform federal court of
appeals decisions on federal law.97
In Investment Co. of the Southwest v. Reese,98 the Supreme Court of
New Mexico expressly stated that its conclusion on the issue of federal
law before it was “guided by the unanimity of opinion among the federal
courts.”99 In so doing, it quoted approvingly the New Hampshire
Supreme Court’s statement in Demarais that “we are guided and bound
by federal statutes and decisions of the federal courts interpreting those
statutes.”100 Thus, Investment Co. of the Southwest can be read to suggest
that the Supreme Court of New Mexico will follow uniform federal court
decisions on federal law, i.e., that the Supreme Court of New Mexico
will consider itself bound by that uniform federal decisional authority.
The Court of Appeals of New York appears to follow a similar approach
when federal decisional law is uniform on an issue of federal law.101
Connecticut has staked an approach somewhere between the two
extremes, treating Second Circuit pronouncements on federal law as
strongly persuasive. Like many other states, Connecticut’s earlier view
was unequivocal that the rulings of federal district courts and courts of
appeals on the meaning of federal law bound them when faced with
federal law questions.102 A recent line of decisions from the Connecticut
96

781 So. 2d 165 (Ala. 2000).
Id. at 168.
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875 P.2d 1086 (N.M. 1994).
99
Id. at 1090 (citing Desmarais v. Joy Mfg. Co., 538 A.2d 1218, 1220 (N.H. 1988)).
100
Id.
101
See Flanagan v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 495 N.E. 2d 345, 348 (N.Y. 1986)
(“When there is neither decision of the Supreme Court nor uniformity in the decisions of
the lower Federal courts, however, a State court required to interpret the Federal statute
has the same responsibility as the lower Federal courts and is not precluded from
exercising its own judgment or bound to follow the decision of the Federal Circuit Court
of Appeals within the territorial boundaries of which it sits.”) (citations omitted).
102
See Brownell v. Union & New Haven Trust Co., 124 A.2d 901, 906 (Conn. 1956)
(citing numerous decisions from federal district courts and courts of appeals and stating
that “[i]t is needless to say that the interpretation given to federal legislation by the
federal courts is binding upon state courts.”).
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Supreme Court, however, reflects that Connecticut courts generally103 no
longer consider Second Circuit decisions on federal law binding, though
they will treat them as strongly persuasive. In Red Maple Properties v.
Zoning Commission of Brookfield,104 the Connecticut Supreme Court
observed that:
“The decisions of the federal circuit in which a state court is
located are entitled to great weight in the interpretation of a
federal statute. This is particularly true in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cases,
where the federal statute confers concurrent jurisdiction on the
federal and state courts. It would be a bizarre result if this court
[adopted one interpretation] when in another courthouse, a few
blocks away, the federal court, being bound by the Second
Circuit rule, [adopted a different one].”105

In Turner v. Frowein,106 the court endorsed the Red Maple
Properties approach and, for the first time, specifically stated that
Second Circuit decisions on federal law did not bind the court.107 In
Szewczyk v.Department of Social Services,108 the Connecticut Supreme
Court reiterated its view “that, while persuasive, decisions of the Second
Circuit are not necessarily binding upon us.”109 But in the same breath, it
stated that “[d]eparture from Second Circuit precedent on issues of
federal law . . . should be constrained in order to prevent the plaintiff’s
decision to file an action in federal District Court rather than a state court
located ‘a few blocks away’ from having the ‘bizarre’ consequence of
being outcome determinative.”110 The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
appears to apply a similar rule of strong deference to its federal circuit
court’s holdings on matters of federal law.111

103
But see Eacott v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 673 A.2d 587, 590 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996) (in
deciding a question of federal preemption, holding that “[b]ecause the issue of
preemption is a matter of federal law, we are bound by the decision [of the Second
Circuit] in Bleiler [v. Cristwood Constr., Inc., 72 F.3d 13 (2d Cir. 1995)] under the
supremacy clause of article six of the United States Constitution.”).
104
610 A.2d 1238 (Conn. 1992).
105
Id. at 1242 n.7 (citation omitted).
106
752 A.2d 955 (Conn. 2000).
107
Id. at 971.
108
881 A.2d 259 (Conn. 2005).
109
Id. at 266 n.11 (citation omitted).
110
Id. (citation omitted).
111
See Littlefield v. Maine Dep’t of Human Servs., 480 A.2d 731, 737 (Me. 1984)
(stating that “in the interests of existing harmonious federal-state relationships, it is a
wise policy that a state court of last resort accept, so far as reasonably possible, a decision
of its federal circuit court on such a federal question.”) (citation omitted).
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Illinois has adopted what appears to be a unique approach to
dealing with federal courts’ federal law holdings. Illinois courts consider
themselves free to depart from federal court decisions on federal
constitutional issues.112 However, the Illinois Supreme Court appears to
have issued inconsistent pronouncements on the precedential force of
federal court decisions on federal statutory issues. In Busch v. Graphic
Color Corp.,113 the Illinois Supreme Court considered whether the
Federal Hazardous Substances Act (“FHSA”) preempted a state common
law failure to warn claim against a product manufacturer. The court
stated “preliminarily” in its analysis of this question “that the decisions
of the Federal courts interpreting a Federal act such as the FHSA are
controlling upon Illinois courts, ‘in order that the act be given uniform
application.’”114 After discussing numerous decisions from the federal
courts of appeals addressing the same or similar issues, the court
followed those decisions and found the state law claim preempted.
In Weiland v. Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc.,115 the Illinois
Supreme Court appeared to narrow the breadth of the principle
enunciated in Busch while considering whether the Medical Device
Amendments of 1976 to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
preempted state common law claims for breach of warranty and defective
design and construction. A few years earlier, the Seventh Circuit had
reached a conclusion critical to resolving this preemption issue contrary
to the one ultimately reached by the court in Weiland. The Weiland court
acknowledged this, but rejected defendant’s assertion that it was bound
by the Seventh Circuit’s holding. It noted that while “[u]niformity is an
important consideration when state courts interpret federal statutes[,] . . .
a concern for uniformity does not command this court’s adherence to the
Seventh Circuit’s precedent in this case.”116 Moreover, the court
reasoned, the Seventh Circuit “exercises no appellate jurisdiction over
this court.”117 The court then stated that it “need not follow Seventh
Circuit precedent interpreting a federal statute where, as here, the
Supreme Court has not ruled on the question presented, there is a split of

112
See People v. Williams, 641 N.E.2d 296, 321 (Ill. 1994) (“[D]ecisions of lower
Federal courts on Federal constitutional questions are not binding on State courts.”)
(citation omitted).
113
662 N.E.2d 397 (Ill. 1996).
114
Id. at 403 (citations omitted).
115
721 N.E.2d 1149 (Ill. 1999).
116
Id. at 1154.
117
Id.
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authority among the federal circuit courts of appeals, and, we believe, the
case from the Seventh Circuit was wrongly decided.”118
Two federal statutory preemption decisions by the Illinois Supreme
Court in 2001 appeared to adopt contradictory approaches to the issue. In
Sundance Homes, Inc. v. County of DuPage,119 the court once again
observed in dicta that “federal court decisions interpreting a federal act
are actually binding upon our Illinois courts . . . .”120 Several months
later, in Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine,121 the court, without even
mentioning Sundance Homes, reasoned that “[a]lthough we have stated
in the past that the decisions of federal courts interpreting a federal
statute are controlling on Illinois courts,” this view “overstates the degree
of deference this court must pay to federal decisions.”122 It then
emphasized that uniformity in the application of federal law was the
animating principle in deciding whether to follow federal court
precedent, particularly where “the federal statute relates to a product that
is inherently mobile and thus likely to move from state to state.”123 In the
case before the court, this interest in a uniform application of federal
statutes led it to “give considerable weight to the decisions of federal
courts of appeals and federal district courts . . . .”124
The most recent pronouncements from the Illinois Supreme Court
appear to maintain the inconsistency that has marked the court’s
treatment of federal court of appeals precedent. In Borowiec v. Gateway
2000, Inc.,125 the court considered whether breach of warranty claims
under the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty—Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Act were arbitrable under the Federal
Arbitration Act. After discussing three federal court of appeals decisions
construing Magnuson-Moss, the court quoted its statement in Busch that
“decisions of the Federal Courts interpreting a Federal Act . . . are
controlling upon Illinois courts, ‘in order that the act be given uniform
application.’”126 Because the federal court of appeals decisions
construing Magnuson-Moss were uniform, the court in Borowiec
followed those decisions. More recently, however, in Bowman v.
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Id. (citation omitted).
746 N.E.2d 254 (Ill. 2001).
Id. at 266 (citing Busch v. Graphic Color Corp., 662 N.E.2d 397, 335 (Ill. 1996)).
757 N.E.2d 75 (Ill. 2001), rev’d on other grounds, 537 U.S. 51 (2002).
Id. at 80 (citing Busch, 662 N.E.2d 397).
Id.
Id.
808 N.E.2d 957 (Ill. 2004).
Id. at 970 (citations omitted).

26

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 3:001

American River Transportation Co.,127 the court unequivocally
“reject[ed] plaintiff’s claim that we are bound by federal court decisions
on this issue [of federal statutory interpretation].”128 It concluded that
“federal circuit and district court decisions were recognized in Sprietsma
as merely being persuasive.”129
Some federal courts of appeals have addressed the force of federal
court decisions on issues of federal law in state courts and, unlike most
of the state court decisions discussed above, have done so in fairly
substantial depth. In United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods,130 the
Seventh Circuit analyzed the “sole reason” advanced by a habeas
petitioner in support of the issuance of a writ—that the Supreme Court of
Illinois’ affirmance of his conviction and rejection of his federal
constitutional challenge to the state law under which he was convicted
contradicted the decision of a federal district court finding the statute
unconstitutional.131 The Seventh Circuit observed that state courts were
divided on the question of whether they were bound by federal court
decisions on issues of federal law, and sided with the view that those
courts were not so bound. The court explained that both state courts of
last resort and federal courts of appeal were, with respect to federal law
questions, “coordinate courts” subject to the “supervisory jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court of the United States.”132 But “because lower federal
courts exercise no appellate jurisdiction over state tribunals, decisions of
lower federal courts are not conclusive on state courts.”133
In Yniguez v. Arizona,134 however, the Ninth Circuit expressed
“serious doubts” that state courts could ignore the decisions of federal
courts of appeal on federal questions.135 It reasoned that “[h]aving chosen
to create the lower federal courts, Congress may have intended that just
as state courts have the final word on questions of state law, the federal
courts ought to have the final word on questions of federal law.”136 “The
contrary view[,]” the Ninth Circuit noted, “could lead to considerable
friction between the state and federal courts as well as duplicative
litigation.”137 Moreover, the court concluded, “if decisions of the federal
127
128
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courts of appeals invalidating state laws carry no authority, it would be
difficult to comprehend why for so many years a right of appeal to the
Supreme Court was provided in all cases in which federal circuit courts
held state statutes unconstitutional.”138
Despite the fact that most states have taken definitive positions on
the precedential force of “inferior” federal courts’ federal law decisions,
they have, by and large, failed to offer much in the way of substantive
analysis in support of their adopted positions. There are certainly
arguments supporting both views. For one, though the Supreme Court
has thus far only construed the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution’s reference to “laws of the United States” to encompass its
own federal law decisions139 (of course, the phrase also includes
“Treaties” and federal statutes “made pursuant to the United States
Constitution”), the Court has not rejected the extension of the Supremacy
Clause to federal courts of appeals’ decisions. Indeed, one can easily
interpret the plain text of the Supremacy Clause to include federal courts
of appeals’ and district court opinions as well.140
But how could or would a court delimit such a reading of the
Supremacy Clause? Would just federal court of appeals’ opinions be
controlling by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, or would federal district
court opinions be as well? If only the former would be controlling, why?
And which federal court of appeals’ decisions would be controlling? Just
those from the circuit in which the particular state is located, i.e., would
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania only be bound by Third Circuit
decisions? If so, why? If federal court of appeals’ decisions outside the
geographical circuit in which a particular state is located can be deemed
controlling, how might a state court select from such out-of-circuit
decisions when they conflict?
These questions highlight the problems with the view that federal
courts of appeals’ decisions are controlling. But there are also problems
with the majority view that federal courts of appeals’ are not controlling.
First, how can one justify that federal courts must strongly defer to state
intermediate appellate courts when ascertaining state law under Erie,
while state courts are free to ignore intermediate federal appellate courts
138
Id. at 737. As indicated above, on appeal, the Supreme Court reacted skeptically to
the Ninth Circuit’s views in Yniguez, referring to the Ninth Circuit’s suggestion that state
courts were bound by federal court decisions on issues of federal law as “remarkable.”
See Arizonans For Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 58 n.11 (1997).
139
See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
140
See, e.g., State v. Burnett, 755 N.E.2d 857, 861 (Ohio 2001) (noting that the
“language of the Supremacy Clause is sufficiently broad (‘the Laws of the United States’)
to encompass all federal court decisions.”).
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when ascertaining federal law? The lack of parallelism at least gives
some pause. More pragmatically, leaving state courts unconstrained in
their adjudication of federal law questions only increases the likelihood
and scope of discord among state and federal courts. We have come to
accept disagreement between and among federal district courts and
courts of appeals on issues of federal law. But disagreement on federal
issues between and among federal courts and the courts of the fifty states
presents an entirely different level of disunity. Moreover, federal court
disagreement is, at least theoretically, generally not intra-circuit—as
discussed above, it is elementary that district courts are bound by their
federal circuit’s federal law pronouncements, and a panel of a federal
court of appeals is bound by a prior panel’s federal law
pronouncements.141 But disagreement between states and federal court of
appeals can create two different standards under the same legal principle
within the same state, the applicability of which depends solely on the
court – state or federal – in which one finds him or herself.
All of this tends to support the view set forth by Professor
Zeigler—“that state courts adopt a single standard that is analogous to
the rule the federal courts follow for ascertaining state law. State courts
should decide federal questions the way they believe the Supreme Court
would decide them.”142 Although this approach will not eliminate
uncertainty and unpredictability, it would provide a uniform rule for all
state courts and limit the frequency of state-federal disagreements on
issues of federal law in the absence of a Supreme Court pronouncement.
III. CONCLUSION
The federal courts of appeals decide thousands of cases each year
addressing questions of both state and federal law. Depending on the
141

Of course, our system does tolerate intra-circuit disagreement among federal
district courts when, for example, their superior federal court of appeals has not spoken
on an issue of federal law in a controlling fashion. Under these circumstances, federal
district courts within the circuit are free to disagree with each other. Moreover, because
federal district courts generally do not consider themselves bound by their own
precedent, see In re Executive Office of the President, 215 F.3d 20, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(per curiam) (“District Court decisions do not establish the law of the circuit, nor, indeed,
do they even establish ‘the law of the district.’”) (citing, inter alia, Threadgill v.
Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 928 F.2d 1366, 1371 (3d Cir. 1991)) (other citation
omitted); G.M. Sign, Inc. v. Global Shop Solutions, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 2d 826, 830 n.4
(N.D. Ill. 2006) (“Decisions of district courts are not binding precedent, even on the same
court.”) (citations omitted). There may also be disagreement within a particular federal
district where the relevant federal court of appeals has not yet ruled on a particular
federal question.
142
See Zeigler, supra note 73, at 1177.
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state or federal jurisdiction, these decisions can be powerful weapons for
litigants asserting or defending state and federal law claims.
Accordingly, knowing how federal court of appeals’ decisions might be
received in a particular state or federal court is essential to practitioners,
and could be the difference between winning and losing. By highlighting
state and federal courts’ contrasting approaches to applying federal court
of appeals’ precedent, this Article should only reinforce the potential
importance of federal court of appeals’ precedent and how it might apply
to help (or hurt) one’s case.

